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From sensory to propositional modality
Towards a phenomenology of epistemic modal meanings
Jean-Rémi Lapaire
We have (…) a perceptual field, a surface in contact
with the world, a permanent rootedness in it (…)
The world ceaselessly assails and beleaguers
subjectivity as waves wash round a wreck on the
shore. All knowledge takes its place within the
horizons opened up by perception.
Merleau-Ponty 1962: 207
 
Introduction
1 It is generally assumed that epistemic modal meanings are more “abstract” than dynamic
and deontic meanings. Yet, epistemic modality provides a strong case for a motion- and
perception-based  treatment  of  modality,  and  calls  for  a  phenomenological
conceptionofspeakers as embodied cognizers.
2 As  the  present  article  purports  to  demonstrate,  visualandhaptic1modalities  structure
much of the socio-cognitive organization of propositional modality, with EYES and HANDS
operating as the metonymically salient body-parts in viewingand manipulationmodels.
As will also become apparent in the course of this presentation, reification plays a
crucial  role  in  the  phenomenology  of  epistemic  modality,  since  solid  facts,
conceivable  events  and  consistent  interpretations  are  typically  “ceived”  (Talmy
2000)  as  things  or  constructions  that  can be  accessed  or  elaborated  in  blended
mental-physical space (Lapaire 2004b). 
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1. Common assumptions and beyond
3 Mainstream presentations of modality in English typically address such issues as:
• a. The existence of “a set of modal verbs that can be formally defined” (Palmer 1986:
33). Central members of the category include the modal auxiliaries may / might, can / could,
must, will / would and shall / should. All display the “NICE properties”: they occur with n
egation, inversion, code, emphatic assertion.
• b. The subjectivity of modal constructions. Modality is fundamentally attitudinal2 : it
involves making judgements about propositions3. Modals are formal markers of subjectivity:
Modality  in  language,  especially  when  marked  grammatically,  seems  to  be
essentially subjective.  (…) Modality in language is (…) concerned with subjective
characteristics of an utterance, and it could be even further argued that subjectivity
is  an  essential  criterion  for  modality.  Modality  could  be  defined  as  the
grammaticalization of speakers’ (subjective) attitudes and opinions.” (Palmer, 1986:
16
• c. The types of modal judgements. “Certainty”, “possibility”, “probability” and “necessity”
are understood to be “core concepts in modality” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 173). Thus,
in “People who are prone to anxiety and pessimism may have drawn a short stick,
genetically speaking” (International Herald Tribune), may codes “epistemic possibility”.
4 Little can be objected to this, except that some sensitive cognitive issues are carefully
avoided. For instance, nothing is said of the dual nature of propositions - material and
notional – in our cognitive systems. As the Latin origin of the term suggests, propositions4
are  objects  of  conceptions that  can  be  “formed”,  “set  forth”  and “examined”  with
imaginary  HANDS and  EYES.  “Attitudes”  to  propositions  -  or  “modal  stances5”  -  are
construed as “position” or “posture” involving some imaginary BODY standing on some
imaginary FEET.
5 If  this  is  correct,  then  it  may  be  safely  claimed  that  the  core  modal  concepts  of
“certainty”, “necessity, “consistency”, etc. are related to bodily organization and sensory-
motor  activity.  Modality  makes  use  of  the  conceptual  resources  afforded  by  the
imaginary body and organs of grammar.6 It has EYES that can see clearly, HANDS that
can hold or press firmly, FEET on which to rest or stand. 
 
2. Reification
6 Propositions  are  not  just  propositions  -  “topics  presented  for  consideration”  or
“statements  that  affirm  or  deny  something”.  Propositions  are  mental-material
constructs that stand for a variety of things: matters to be done or dealt with; stuff that
may be true or false, etc. 
So many things occur that are not “things” in a strict sense – and never will be. (…)
Reification – from latin res ‘thing’ – is the backbone of cognition. An indispensable
mental  tool,  it  involves  mapping  the  central  properties  of  material  objects  –
substance, shape, mass or weight – onto selected “objects” of human experience:
emotions –  or  things felt;  statements –  or  things said;  events  –  or  things done.
(Lapaire 2004a, 452-53)
7 The reification of propositions makes it possible for “certainty ” to be construed as solidity
(as in the phrase solid / hard facts); for“true happenings” to be conceived as things that
have materialized; for “realis assertion” to be the expression of firmstatements, etc. As will
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be shown in section 2., reification is particularly relevant to epistemic modality, since it
has allowed manual-haptic scriptsfor “inference” or “extrapolation” to develop alongside
viewing and journey scripts. The latter combine reification with spatializationthrough the
“location metaphorical system” (Johnson 1997: 39):
ACTIONS  ARE  MOTIONS  ALONG  PATHS from  one  location  (=  state)  to  another  state-
location. (…) STATES ARE LOCATIONS along such metaphorical action-paths, and they
are understood metaphorically as bounded regions (“He’s in love”, “While we are in
flight, please remain seated,” “Stay out of trouble”). CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS from
one state-location to another. We speak of being in or out of a state, of going into or
out of it, of entering or leaving it. PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS toward which we move.
 (Johnson 1997: 37)
8 The use of journey storiesto conceptualize events, together with object-creation, object-
manipulation  and  object-transfer  stories,  suggests  that  narrative  models  for  human
activityexistin  human  cognitive  systemsthatare  related  to  bodily  functioning.  Most
prominent are:
• a. Journey and road map models, in which “doers” are construed as “travellers” and
“achieving” as “getting there.” The profiled body-parts are FEET and LEGS. When applied to
the epistemic domain, the story shows cognizers embarking on various “mental journeys”
which “lead” them to conclusions or allow them to “reach” verdicts. 
• b. Object-manipulation and object–creation models, in which “doers” are construed as “creators”
and their “acts” as “artefacts” (Lapaire 2004a). . The profiled body-parts are ARMS and HANDS.
When applied to the epistemic domain, the story shows cognizers “making” their own
judgements and “constructing” their own “structures of interpretation.”
• c. Viewing models, in which ideas and events are “scenes” that cognizers “observe,” “focus
upon” or form mental pictures of (Lapaire 2004b). EYES are here profiled.
9 The models listed above make it possible for a rich phenomenology of epistemic modal
meanings to develop in language and cognition, as we would like to show.
 
3. Cognizing epistemic modality
10 There is wide agreement among linguists that epistemic modality is essentially about the
speaker’sknowledgeand interpretation of reality:
(Epistemic)  is  derived  from  the  Greek  word  meaning  “understanding”  or
“knowledge”  (rather  than  “belief”),  and  so  is  to  be  interpreted  as  showing  the
status of the speaker’s understanding or knowledge. This clearly includes both his
own judgements and the kind of warrant he has for what he says. (Palmer 1986: 51)
11 Although  the  word  “cognitive”  does  not  normally  occur  in  standard  definitions  of
epistemic modality, epistemic modal judgments are understood to be mental– rather than
pragmatic  –  events.  “Knowledge  and  belief”7 –  and  more  specifically  “necessity,
probability,  or  possibility  in  reasoning”8 –  are  expressed  by  the  speaker  who  “is
committed to the truth of the proposition.”9 Such open “commitment”is usually regarded
as a marked case of subjective involvement. 
12 Mainstream accounts of epistemic modality are based on the “universal” categories of
modal  logic  and  a  narrow  repertoire  of  modal  concepts  that  includes  “certainty”,
“necessity”, “possibility” and “truth” as its core items. Occasional variation in wording
and  emphasis  may  however  be  observed.  Some  presentations  will  underscore  the
importance of “subjectivity” in relation to “degrees of epistemic certainty,” while others
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will devote special attention to the types of “epistemic modal judgements” involved. But
the foundational  character  of  propositional  logic  is  rarely  questioned and superficial
discrepancies should not conceal deep unity of content.
13 Cognitive  grammarians  depart  more  radically  from  received  views  about  epistemic
modality. Building on Sweetser’s hypothesis that deep “semantic linkage” unites root an
epistemic  meanings,  they  place  special  emphasis  on  the  “extension”  of  conceptual
mechanisms from “the sociophysical domain to the epistemic domain” (1990: 51). “Root
meanings,” they argue, act as cognitive primaries analysable in terms of “socio-physical
forces, barriers and paths of different kinds.” Once entrenched, the force-dynamic logic
of root modality naturally “extends” to the “epistemic domain” (56). Such “extension” is
made possible by the fact that “the epistemic world is understood in terms of the socio-
physical world” (59). 
My proposal is that root-modal meanings are extended to the epistemic domain
precisely because we generally use the language of the external world to apply to
the internal world, which is metaphorically structured as parallel to that external
world.  Thus  we  view  our  reasoning  processes  as  being  subject  to  compulsions,
obligations  and  other  modalities,  just  as  our  real-world  actions  are  subject  to
modalities of the same sort. (…) Modal verbs do not have two separate unrelated
senses,  but  rather  show  an  extension  of  the  basic  root-sense  to  the  epistemic
domain – an extension which is strongly motivated by the surrounding linguistic
system. (Sweetser 1990: 50)
14 The  “parallel”  drawn  by  Sweetser  between  “real-world  actions”  and  “reasoning
processes” should be regarded as a major breakthrough in the treatment of epistemic
modal semantics, since it allows “body action stories” (Turner 1996) to be mapped onto
mental events and authorizes the ceptuallinkage of epistemic modality with the sensory
modalities.
15 Langacker’s “basic epistemic model” (1991: 242-43) has also been a major of inspiration to
cognitive grammarians. The model casts the speaker in the role of “conceptualizer (C)”
accepting  certain  “situations”  or  “states  of  affairs”  as  “real.”  The  conceptualizer’s
judgment pertains not so much to “absolute truth” as to what he or she “knows” or
“think they know” (242). The quality and reliability of the knowledge depend on the kind
of “reality” that is dealt with and the modes of “access” used. Thus, the speaker-cognizer
may enjoy “perceptual access” to “portions of the immediate reality” or have “mental
access” to “known reality.” “Reality” itself is defined as a perceptual and / or conceptual
“region,” where “situations” can be “placed” or “established” with varying degrees of
confidence.  “Immediate known reality” surrounds the speaker (246),  while the larger
conceptual region of “unknown reality” contains “situations of at least two sorts: those
whose reality C suspects or contemplates but does not accept as having been established;
and those of which he is entirely ignorant”(243).
16 In Langacker’s epistemic model, degrees of certainty have spatial analogues expressed in
terms of “distance”:
(The) modals can be described as contrasting with one another because they situate
the process at varying distances from the speaker’s position at immediate known
reality. Must, for example, places it very close to known reality – the speaker had
deduced that accepting it as real seems warranted (though he has not yet taken
that final step) - whereas may implies that only that he regards the situation as
compatible with what he knows. (Langacker 1991: 246)
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17 Although Sweetser’s root-to-epistemic principle of “extension” and Langacker’s “basic
epistemic model” have been refined over the years, they remain a major source of
inspiration to cognitive grammarians. Even those linguists that reject cognitive models
must  acknowledge  this  simple  fact:  epistemic  modal  judgements  are  grammatically
explicit cognitive eventsthat most clearly cast speakers in the role of cognizers. The study
of  epistemic  modality  cannot  be  conducted  without  due  reference  to  the  cognizing
subject,  since  the  “beliefs”  and  “intellectual  judgements”  arrived  at  through
“observation”, “speculation” or “reasoning” necessarily involve some form of cognitive
processing on the part of the speaker. Epistemic modality is proof that language truly
opens a “window on thought” (Jackendoff 1993: 184). Onlookers that care to stare are
likely to discern the following cognitive mechanisms and configurations:
 
3.1. Epistemic modality is interpretive and conclusive 
18 The way we look at epistemic modality and refer to it as a semantic category is crucially
linked to the way we cognize events and to our folk conceptions of truth and knowledge. 
19 Propositions subject  to epistemic modal  judgments do not represent static  objects  of
conceptions but  structures  of  interpretation subject  to dynamic mental  processing.  The
processing is all the more active, as the coded conception is not presented as fact10 but as
a form of speculation,11 i.e. a deduction, an inference12 or “appearance, based on the evidence
of (possibly fallible) senses” (Palmer 1986: 51).
20 As Lakoff (1993) has convincingly argued, reasoning is generally construed as a mental
journey, with some initial observation or premise established as a starting point and some
conclusion or  verdict  as  a  finishing  point.  The journey model  –  which metonymically
profiles FEET  /  LEGS and walking – thus seems relevant to epistemic modality,  and has
indeed received considerable attention from cognitive grammarians, although few have
taken the trouble to relate it explicitly to bodily organization and narrative imagining.
For  language  unfolds  the  story  of  embodied  cognizers  traveling  along  the  paths  of
knowledge, i.e. following a particular course of reasoning and eventually reaching, coming to
or arriving at a conclusion. As Huddleston and Pullum suggest in their analysis of “He
must have been delayed,” forces  and directionality often play a key role in the mental
journey to epistemic certainty, since speakers are often “led” or “forced” to inescapable
conclusions (2002: 178). 
21 Other body action stories exist that are equally meaningful. Stories of EYES seeing and
ARMS  /  HANDS drawing,  pulling,  giving,  holding,  which  are  frequently  involved  the
narrative construal of inference. For example, manual-haptic models structure such basic
“epistemic scenes” as evidence being gathered or collected; opinions formed; hypotheses
put  forward;  interpretations  given;  positive  or  negative  judgements  made  and
conclusions13 drawn (from a body of evidence), etc.
22 Assuming  that  the  journey,  viewing  and  manipulation  stories  are  not just  “dead
metaphors”  but  live  structures  of  understanding  acting  as  “hidden  hands”  in  the
“cognitive  unconscious”14 of  logicians  and  grammarians,  then  language  must  be  the
central blending medium, the great architect, the indefatigable perpetuator of the lexical
integration  of  sensory-motor  with  epistemic  activity.  Such  powerful  integration  is
achieved by producing a single ceptual narrative in which the perceptual15 “stories” of
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walking  (to  a  place),  observing  or  physically  manipulating  (something)  and  the
conceptual story of “deciding by reasoning” are all projected into a single blended space:
23 The conceptual resources afforded by the blend are immense and unconsciously tapped by
all  linguists,  irrespective  of  theoretical  affiliation.  Huddleston  and  Pullum,  whose
authoritative Cambridge Grammar of the English Language is anything but “cognitive”, are
no exception to the rule:
‘Epistemic’ is derived from the Greek for ‘knowledge’: this kind of modality involves
qualifications concerning the speaker’s knowledge. The unmodalised He has been
delayed presents the truth of the proposition as something I know, whereas He must
have been delayed presents it as something I arrive at by inference and in He may
have been delayed I merely put it forward as a possibility. (Huddleston and Pullum
2002: 178. Underline is ours)
 
3.2. Epistemic modality deals with the reality or truth status of
propositions16
24 What is held to be “true” or “real” must acquire the “factive and veridical” status of
entities presenting themselves  at  “a concrete level  of  palpability” (Talmy 2000:  144).
Reality forms a ceptual region where events are construed as blended mental-material entities
that can be physically and mentally located and accessed. 
25 Regardless of the actual reliability of sensory-motor knowledge, our “sense of certainty
about existence” is based on the perceptual logic of “online sensory stimulation” (Talmy
2000). Depending on the cultural role played by online perception in the establishment of
knowledge,  epistemic judgements of certainty will  present different ceptual  formats in
different  languages.  In  Western  culture,  were  the  visual  and  haptic  channels  are
culturally  acknowledged as  trustworthy,  the  linguistic  expression of  what  is  or  isn’t
“true” has a marked ceptual character, i.e. clearly integrates per-ceptual with con-ceptual 
experience.  Despite  the  time  old  philosophical  distinction  between  “reality”  and
“appearance”, our culture links reality with visibility (Debré 1992) and palpability (Talmy
2000):
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Nous  sommes  la  première  civilisation  (…)  à  avoir  posé  un  trait  d’égalité  entre
visibilité, réalité et vérité17. (Debré 1992: 499)
At the concrete level of palpability, an entity that one looks at is experienced as
fully manifest and palpable, as clear and vivid, with the ostensive characteristics of
precise  form,  texture,  coloration  (…)  The  entity  is  experienced  as  having  real,
physical, autonomous existence. (Talmy 2000: 141)
 
3.3 Epistemic modality is “strong” or “weak” assertion of belief 
In many languages it is possible to make at least two kinds of epistemic judgement,
a ‘weak’ one and a ‘strong’ one. A typical example is English with its modal verbs
may and must. (Palmer 1986: 57)
26 It  is widely assumed that the expression of epistemic certainty is both a rational and
subjective process in which a speaker “weakly” or “strongly” asserts his or her “belief.”
Thus, in realis assertion (Givón 1993: 170), “the proposition is strongly asserted as true”
since “the speaker has evidence or other grounds to defend his / her strong belief,” while
in irrealis assertion “the event is weakly asserted as either possible or likely (or necessary
or desired).”
27 Asserting  with  “confidence”  or  “doubt”  is  force-dynamically  expressed  as  making  a
“strong” or “weak” assertion. The “strength” of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of
the  proposition  depends  on  his  or  her  discourse  strategy,  knowledge  status18 and
intellectual method19.
The  first  dimension  [of  modality]  concerns  the  strength  of  commitment
(prototypically the speaker’s commitment) to the factuality or actualisation of the
situation. This is where we distinguish the core modal concepts of necessity and
possibility:  necessity  involves  a  strong commitment,  possibility  a  weak  one.
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 175. Italics ours)
28 Asserting the reality of a proposition has a marked physical dimension reflected:
• a. In the body behavior of speakers as they make their epistemic judgments. 
• b. In the “physical” language used to describe epistemic stances: to make a firmstatement; to
express hard convictions, to gathersolid evidence on which to rest20 or base21 one’s claims, etc.
29 Socio-pragmatic  scripts  for  assertion  are  about  pressing one’s  ideas,  notions  or
conceptions onto other people, and so have a manual-haptic basis. At a more general level
of cognitive organization, manual force is applied to some reified object of belief, so as to fix
it  firmly into the “ground” of  reality” –  reality being construed as  a  blended mental-
materialregion where  real  or  conceivable  things can  be  placed with  lesser  or  greater
confidence (Lapaire 2004c). Thus, “strong epistemic judgments” of the kind exemplified
by Palmer – “He must be there.” “He can’t be there” – establish conceptions with a firmer
hand than the weaker, shakier “epistemic judgments” conveyed by may in “He may be
there” (1986: 57).
30 All things considered, “the assertion of belief” or “the commitment to the truth of a
proposition” cannot be considered as  purely rational  acts,  removed from spatial  and
sensory-motor experience. The verticality schema that structures the so-called epistemic
scale  of  certainty is  rooted  in  spatial  experience.  The  modal  may in  He  may  be  right
expresses a “low” degree of certainty, compared to must in He must be right, which codes a
“high”  degree.  Epistemic  gradients are  found  everywhere  in  the  literature  and
unquestionably reflect a spatial construal of intensity 22 applied to “modal judgements.”
Finally, socio-physical pressure and forces are manifest in the core notion of strength of
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assertion, since propositions are said to be weakly or strongly asserted, depending on the
extent of the speaker’s “commitment.”
 
3.4. Epistemic certainty as intellectual vision: the epistemic viewing
model
Numerous  aspects  of  construal  that  are  quite  important  linguistically  can
reasonably  be  interpreted  as  general  conceptual  analogues  of  phenomena  well
known in visual perception. (Langacker 2000: 206)
31 There exists a visual grammar of epistemic modality, which is but one instantiation of the
more general ceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, originally studied by Lakoff and
Johnson (1980: 48). In the epistemic viewing model, objects of conceptions have visible
outline or shape, and cognizers are viewers. The visual analogs of certainty are clarity and
sharpness:
The  parameter  of  clarity  is  a  gradient  at  the  high  end  of  which  an  entity  is
experienced  as  being  clear,  distinct,  and  definite.  At  the  low  end,  an  entity  is
experienced as being vague, indistinct, indefinite, or murky. (Talmy 2000: 141)
32 Having certain knowledge of a particular situation is analogous to getting a clear or sharp
picture of the scene. The sense of clarity and specificity is enhanced if the picture is “fine-
grained” or has a “high definition.” Conversely, a lower degree of epistemic certainty has
a “blurring effect” (Givón 1993: 183), preventing sharp intellectual vision. Different modals
produce  different  viewing  arrangements  or  code  different  visual  experiences.  The
sharpness of will and must can thus be contrasted with the “haziness”, “fogginess” or
“blurredness” of may:
 (1)  Italy's  economy  will  /  may  grow  less  next  year  than  the  government  is
forecasting, two separate reports said. 
(2) You are / may be wrong; she is / may be passionately devoted to her child.
(3) That must / will / may be her waiting at the door.
(4) You’ll love it / may not like it.
33 In the epistemic viewing model, the “epistemic certainty gradient” (Givon 2001: 314) ) has
the following visual analogs:
• Subjective Certainty As Sharp Mental Image
• Absolute Certainty As Clarity and / or Transparency
• Low Certainty As Poor Visibility / Fuzzy Picture
• High Certainty As Clear View / Sharp Picture 
34 More  would  deserve  to  be  said  about  “mental  vision”  in  relation  to  prediction  and
extrapolation (see Lapaire 2004b).  Suffice  it  to  say that  the visual  format imposed on
epistemic modal semantics is proof enough of the existence of a true phenomenology of
modality.
 
3.5. Epistemic meaning making: the epistemic workshop model 
35 In the epistemic workshop, the deductive or interpretive work performed by speakers is
construed  as  a  creative  enterprise.  Cognizers  act  as  creators  or  builders  that  make
judgements, produce interpretations, form opinions, etc. using facts and pieces of evidence as
construction material and rational capacities as technical skill.
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36  Epistemic judgments are thus cognized as products or constructs that are elaborated and
manipulated  as  speakers  express  their  beliefs.  Propositions  are  firmly  or  tentatively
“placed” (Latin ponere) before the addressee, while conjectures or “thrown” (Latin jacere)
into  the  realm of  possibility.  In  either  case,  the  object  or  construct  must  resist  the
antagonistic,  unsettling,  or  disintegrating  forces  of  contradiction  (Lapaire  2004c).
Consistent23 interpretations must “stand” to reason or “withstand” attack(Latin stare “to
stand”). Weak arguments are shaky and likely to collapse. Untenable theories of truth (Latin
tenere “to hold”)cannot be “upheld” or maintained24 for long, and may ultimately have to
be withdrawn lest they crumble, collapse or fall apart. 
37 In the epistemic workshop, the mind has imaginary HANDS that produce objectsof conceptions
and structuresof interpretation:
• Mental Activity As Manual Work
• Reasoning Skill As Manual Skill
• Meaning As Substance
• Interpreting As Forming, Shaping, Assembling or Building
• Asserting As Fixing, Placing
• Assurance As Firmness 
• Accepting As Taking, Holding 
• Agreeing As Touching
• Reality As Mental-Material Region Filled with Things
• Real As Standing There 
• Certainty As Tangibility
• Consistency As Solidity and / or Balance
• etc. 
38 It  is important to note that manual-haptic conceptions of “mental work” listed above,
require the activation of image schemata (Johnson 1987) such as the THING-schema;  the 
FORCE-schema, the BALANCE-schema, the CONTAINER-schema and the PART-WHOLE schema.
 
3.6. Performing epistemic modality
39 The visual and manual-haptic models that structure epistemic certainty are rooted in
early sensory-motor intelligence and therefore entrenched in everyday cognition. If they
were  not,  then  short  gesture  performances  “illustrating”  epistemic  modal  meanings
would be of  little  heuristic  value.  Quite the opposite seems to be true.  For example,
metaphoric  hand  gestures  showing  how  the  past  may  be  “reconstructed”  with  the
preterit and modal constructions are most efficient with learners. The simple past
establishes “solid facts”(She knew him); while must have is used to set up a structurethat
“stands  firmly  in  the  ground” (She must  have  known  him).  Can’t  have “brushes  aside”
inconsistencies  (She  can’t  have  met  him)  and  may’ve codes  a  form  of  oscillation  or
“swaying” (She may have met him).
A “performance” of epistemic modality where propositions are theatrically “held”
to  be  true  or  “dropped”  as  unacceptable,  where  sharp  and  blurred  pictures  of
events  are  displayed  and  scrutinized,  make  a  lot  of  sense  to  learners,  thereby
confirming  the  cognitive  reality  of  the  ceptual  link  between  sensory  and
propositional modalities (Lapaire & Masse 2005).
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Concluding remarks
40 Cognitive linguistics and functional  grammar have paved the way for promising new
sensory-motor approaches to modality. Talmy’s influential paper on “Force dynamics in
Language and Cognition” (1985), Sweetser’s convincing argument that the forces, paths
and barriers  of  “socio-physical  modality”  extend to “the world of  reasoning” (1990),
Givón’s notion of “manipulation” as a semantic and syntactic verb-category (1993), all
suggest that viable “phenomenological” alternatives to traditional modal logic exist that
are worth developing.
41 Even the most “rational” types of logical reasoning associated with epistemic modality –
inferential,  deductive,  conclusive  –  are  related  to  sensory-motor  experience  and
imaginatively structured by a number of scripts and schemata that achieve the narrative
compression and simplification of complex ceptual mechanisms. 
42 Assuming that symbolic structure is a faithful revealer of conceptualizing mechanisms,
then  lexical  idioms  like  “it  stands  to  reason”,  “it  makes  (good)  sense”,  “it  is  quite
consistent”, “it holds” indicate thatepistemic viewing and meaning making are part of the
conceptual organization of the grammar of modality.
43 The central claim made in this article that epistemic modal systems are not removed from the
perceptual and motor systems of speakers and, more generally, that perception and motion are an
integral  part  of  reason should  not  be  considered  a  challenge  to  logical  and truth-conditional
systems. If anything, the theory of embodied rationality (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) can serve as a
useful, thought-provoking additive to the time-proven modal logic inherited from Aristotle and
scholasticism. It may play an even greater role if one makes the assumption that Merleau-Ponty’s
“subject of perception” (1962: 207) is not only relevant but central to the grammar of modality, as
the rich evidential systems25 found in many languages attest26. Such systems overtly connect
sensory  evidence -  in  particular  “hearing”  and  “seeing”  –  with  epistemic  certainty.  The
connection, although less apparent in English, might be worth investigating there too. Results, it is
hoped,  should  speak  in  favor  of  an  integrative,  multi-dimensional  grammar of  modality
incorporating,  among other  relevant  parameters,  visual and manual-haptic  concepts.  Thus,
remarks on visual and tactile analogues of epistemic certainty, sweeping statements about the
centrality of substance, contact and manipulation in grammar, might some day be treated as more
than  amusing  “phenomenological  postscripts”  refreshingly  added  to  the  sterner  logical
descriptions that dominate the field of modality in English. Indeed, vision, touch and manipulation
might move from the fringes to the centre and some day become “the heart of the matter.”
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NOTES
1.  Related to or based on the sense of touch. 
2.  In Huddleston and Pullum’s words, “modality is in the first instance a matter of the speaker’s
attitude” (2002: 173).
3.  (…) the modality codes the speaker’s attitude toward the proposition. By ‘attitude’ we mean
here  primarily  two  types  of  judgement made  by  the  speaker  concerning  the  propositional
information carried in the clause:
Epistemic judgements of truth, probability, certainty, belief or evidence.
Evaluative judgements of desirability, preference, intent, ability, obligation or manipulation.
(Givón 1993: 169)
4.  From Latin pro- “forward, out” + ponere “to place”.
5.  From Latin stare “to stand”.
6.  “Le corps et les organes imaginaires de la grammaire” (Lapaire 2005: 37)
7.  “The area of mood concerned with knowledge and belief, including at least the expression of
possibility, probability and certainty (as perceived by the speaker), and, in some views, also the
expression of the speaker’s degree of commitment to what she/he says, as, for example, by the
use of evidentials.” (R.L. Trask 1993: 92)
8.  “Linguists  have characterized as  root those meanings which denote real-world obligation,
permission,  or  ability  (as  in  example  [1]);  and  as  epistemic those  which  denote  necessity,
probability, or possibility in reasoning (as in [2]).
(1) John must be home by ten; Mother won’t let him stay out any later. 
(2) John must be home already; I see his coat.” (E. Sweetser 1990: 49)
9.  “Epistemic modality applies to assertions and indicates the extent to which the speaker is
committed  to  the  truth  of  the  proposition.  The  unmarked  case  in  this  domain  is  the  total
commitment  to  the  truth  of  the  proposition,  and  markers  of  epistemic  modality  indicate
something less than a total commitment by the speaker to the truth of the proposition.” (Bybee
et al. 1994: 179)
From sensory to propositional modality
Corela, 4-1 | 2006
13
10. Fact,  from Latin factum “something done”, from factus “made,” from facere “to make.” An
event  or  thing  known  to  have  happened  or  existed,  a  truth  verifiable  from  experience  or
observation, (legal) an actual event, happening, etc. (Collins English Dictionary).
11.  From Latin speculari “to spy out” from specere “to look at.”
12.  From Latin inferre “to bring into,” from ferre “to bear, to carry.”
13.  From Lat. concludere “to enclose” from claudere “to close.”
14. Hidden hands and cognitive unconscious refer to Lakoff and Johnson (1999).
15. Perceptual is  here  used  in  Talmy’s  extended  sense,  covering  all  kinds  of  sensory-motor
experience, not just sensation.
16.  “An epistemic modal is used to express a judgment by the speaker about the truth of the
proposition he is presenting.” (Palmer 1987: 98)
17.  “Visible = Real = True”. “We are the first civilization (…) ever to have equated visibility with
reality and truth.”
18.  For a discussion of “knowledge status” see Talmy 2000: 155-56.
19.  E.g.  logical inference (She was born after the war,  so she can’t  have known him)  vs.  personal
extrapolation from present circumstances (She must be desperate to leave).
20.  From Latin re- + stare “to stand.”
21.  The abstract use of basis is essentially ceptual since it blends the material configuration of
some  concrete  surface  or  object  underlying  or  supporting  something,  with  the  intellectual
configuration of some “foundational” principle on which some idea “rests”. From Greek bainein
“to step, to go.”
22.  From Latin intendere “to stretch out.”
23.  From Latin consistere “to stand firm,” from sistere “to stand, to cause to stand”, Latin stare “to
stand”
24.  From French maintenir, literally“to hold in the hand,” from Latin manu tenere.
25. “A  grammatical  category  occurring  in  some  languages  by  which  all  statements  (and
sometimes other sentence types) are overtly and obligatorily marked to indicate the source of
the speaker’s evidence for her/his utterance. (…) Evidential systems, which are sometimes called
verification systems,  are sometimes regarded as forming part of mood systems in languages
exhibiting them.” (Trask 1993: 95)
26.  Languages that have marked systems of inferential modality connect sensory evidence with
(epistemic)  certainty.  As Palmer remarks in his  discussion of  evidentials  (1986:  67-76),  direct
observation (witnessing, recording) is sometimes presented as fallible.
RÉSUMÉS
L’univers mental de la modalité épistémique n’est pas entièrement coupé de l’univers physique
des objets et des substances que les êtres humains perçoivent et avec lesquels ils interagissent. Il
existe  un lien métaphorique entre attitudes (ou postures)  modales  et  attitudes (ou postures)
corporelles, comme l’atteste l’emploi courant d’expressions visuelles et manuelles pour exprimer
les notions ou processus modaux. L’énonciateur-conceptualisateur exécute symboliquement une
gestualité mentale et s’implique dans des scènes « ceptuelles » de vision, de mouvement et de
manipulations  épistémiques.  Les  hypothèses  sont  « forgées »,  les  faits  sont  « posés »,  les
jugements  « appliqués »  ou « assénés »  avec plus  ou moins  de « force ».  Les  conclusions  sont
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« atteintes »  et  les  déductions  « faites »  ou  « opérées ».  Les  structures  interprétatives  sont
« construites ».  Les  arguments  logiques  « tiennent  debout ».  L’incohérent  « s’écroule »  ou
« s’effondre ». Les analogies perceptuelles les plus courantes de la certitude et de l’évidence sont
la  « clarté »,  la  « transparence »  ainsi  que  la  « solidité.  Les  propositions  sont  des  objets  de
conceptions hybrides, intégrant le matériel au mental, localisés dans des espaces matériels et
mentaux  mixtes.  Le  corps  symbolique  de  la  cognition  y  accède,  en  utilisant  les  organes,
perceptions et mouvements imaginaires inscrits dans le langage.
The mental  world of  epistemic modality  is  not entirely removed from the material  world of
objects and substances that humans perceive and interact with. Modal stances are symbolically
related to physical stances and metaphorically described in terms of visual and manual-haptic
experience.  Cognizers  perform  mental  gestures  and  engage  in  “ceptual”scenes  of  epistemic
vision, motion and manipulation. Thus, hypotheses are “formed”; while assertions, judgements
and  conjectures  are  “made”  with  varying  degrees  of  “strength”.  Conclusions  are  typically
“reached” and inferences “drawn”. Interpretations are “constructs”. Logical arguments “stand”.
Inconsistent  statements  “collapse”  or   “fall  apart”.  The  common  perceptual  analogues  of
certainty  are  “clarity”  and  “solidity”.  Propositions  are  blended  mental-material  objects  of
conception  that  the  imaginary  body  of  cognition  accesses  in  blended mental-physical  space,
using the imaginary organs, perceptions and motions encoded in the language.
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